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Abstract
This study focuses on the relationship between the use of specific cognitive emotion
regulation strategies and emotional problems. Two samples were included: 99 adults from
a clinical population and 99 matched non-clinical adults. Data was obtained in both
groups on the use of nine cognitive emotion regulation strategies: self-blame, other-blame,
rumination, catastrophizing, putting into perspective, positive refocusing, positive
reappraisal, acceptance, and refocus on planning.
Logistic regression analyses show that self-blame, catastrophizing, and positive
reappraisal were, relative to the other strategies, the most important variables for
distinguishing between the two samples. While the first two strategies were reported
significantly more often by the clinical than by the non-clinical sample, positive
reappraisal was reported significantly more often by the non-clinical sample. The results
suggest that cognitive emotion regulation strategies may be a useful target for prevention
and intervention. Copyright # 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Years of research have clearly demonstrated the important role emotions play in many
aspects of daily life as well as their influence on adaptation to life stressors and transitions.
Basically, emotions can be seen as the biological reactions that arise when a situation is
appraised as presenting important opportunities or challenges and co-ordinate our
responding to important environmental events (Gross & Mun˜oz, 1995). Examples of
human emotions are amusement, anger, disgust, fear, and anger (Gross & Mun˜oz, 1995).
Although emotions are biologically based, people are able to influence the emotions they
have as well as the way these are expressed. This is called emotion regulation and refers to
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the broad category of ‘all the extrinsic and intrinsic processes responsible for monitoring,
evaluating and modifying emotional reactions, especially their intensive and temporal
features, to accomplish one’s goals’ (Thompson, 1994, p. 27). Generally speaking,
emotion regulation is critical in initiating, motivating, and organizing adaptive behaviour,
and in preventing stressful levels of negative emotions and maladaptive behaviour
(Cicchetti, Ackerman, & Izard, 1995). It has been shown that there are important
individual differences in the ways how people regulate their emotions and that some ways
of regulating emotions may be more adaptive than others. Problems in emotion regulation
are common among different forms of psychopathology (Gross & Mun˜oz, 1995; Kring,
2001). Although the process of emotion regulation in disordered and nondisordered
individuals is essentially the same, the difference appears to be that individuals suffering
from some form of psychopathology are impaired in one or more emotion regulation
strategies (Kring, 2001). Therefore, as Bonanno (2001) suggests, an important direction
for future empirical investigations pertains to the question of whether specific emotion
regulation strategies can be considered adaptive or maladaptive.
According to Thompson’s definition, however, the concept of emotion regulation is a
very broad conceptual rubric encompassing many biological, cognitive, and behavioural
regulatory processes (Gross, 1998, 1999; Thompson & Calkins, 1996). In addition, it may
refer equally well to how emotions regulate something else, such as thoughts or behaviour,
or to how emotions themselves are regulated. Likewise, it may concern the regulation of
emotions by oneself, or the regulation of emotions by others, or it may refer to conscious
or unconscious forms of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998, 1999). It has been argued that
although all kinds of emotion regulation are important and should be examined, the
different forms should be clearly distinguished (Gross, 1999). It has been proposed to
make a distinction between the regulation of the internal states themselves (and to call this
emotion regulation) and the regulation of the behavioural reactions associated with these
internal states (and to call this behavioural regulation; see Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, &
Reiser, 2000). The definition of emotion regulation could be narrowed down, then, to
‘the process of initiating, maintaining, modulating, or changing the occurrence, intensity,
or duration of internal feeling states and emotion-related physiological processes, often in
the service of accomplishing one’s goals’ (Eisenberg et al., 2000, p. 137). But still in this
definition, emotion regulation remains to refer to a wide range of physiological,
attentional, and cognitive processes.
For example, in a physiological way, emotions are self-regulated by a rapid pulse,
increased breathing rate (or shortness of breath), perspiration or other concomitants of
emotional arousal. Emotions can also be managed by a range of unconscious cognitive
processes, such as selective attention processes, memory distortions, denial, or projection.
In addition, emotions can be regulated by more conscious cognitive (coping) processes,
such as cognitive restructuring, blaming oneself, ruminating, or catastrophizing. Although
these aspects of emotion regulation all have received attention in recent years, most of the
relevant work on emotion regulation is scattered through different bodies of literature and
generally has not been integrated (Eisenberg, 2000; Gross, 1999). More and more it
becomes clear that, although the concept is very useful as a theoretical description or
explanation of the emotion system, the total process of emotion regulation is too complex
and too broad to enable us to empirically focus on all aspects, mechanisms, and processes
at once. As Cicchetti et al. (1995) state: although the construct of emotion regulation is
useful as a metaphor of balance, it is too broad to be useful as an explanation of behaviour.
Therefore, we believe theory and research would be facilitated by attempting to describe
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aspects of the construct, and not trying to explain too many aspects of the construct at the
same time.
The present study will focus on the conscious, cognitive part of emotion regulation,
globally to be understood as the conscious, cognitive way of handling the intake of
emotionally arousing information (see Thompson, 1991). This refers to the part of emotion
regulation concerning the conscious, cognitive processes by which individuals regulate
their own emotions, Obviously, the regulation of emotions through thoughts or cognitions
is inextricably associated with human life and helps people to manage or regulate emotions
or feelings, and to keep control over and/or not become overwhelmed by their emotions,
for example during or after the experience of threatening or stressful events.
The concept of conscious, cognitive emotion regulation is narrowly related to the
concept of cognitive coping. Current theory and research on coping rests on the notion that
coping primarily involves conscious strategies of responding to stressful of negative events
(Higgins & Endler, 1995). These strategies can refer either to cognitive or to behavioural
strategies (thinking versus doing) (Lazarus, 1999). In general, two major functions of
coping are distinguished: problem-focused coping and emotion-focused coping. Whereas
problem-focused coping strategies refer to attempts to act on the stressor (comparable to
emotion-related behaviour regulation), emotion-focused coping refers to attempts to
manage the emotions associated with the stressor (comparable to emotion regulation, see
Eisenberg et al., 2000; Compas, Orosan, & Grant, 1993; Lazarus, 1993).
Even though the operationalization of coping by the distinction between problem-
focused and emotion-focused coping strategies is widely accepted and most coping
measures are based on it, there is an important conceptual problem associated with it.
There is another important dimension that crosses the boundaries of this division, i.e. the
cognitive (what you think) versus the behavioural (what you do) strategies (see also
Holahan, Moos, & Schaeffer, 1996). For example, thoughts about ‘planning’ are
considered a problem-focused coping strategy, while an example of problem-focused
coping in a behavioural way is ‘taking direct actions’. Examples of cognitive versus
behavioural expressions of emotion-focused coping are respectively ‘positive reappraisal’
(a thought) and ‘social support seeking’ (an action). As Compas, Connor-Smith, Saltzman,
Harding Thomsen, and Wadsworth (2001) have noted, the widely used problem- and
emotion-focused dimensions are at best insufficient in explaining the diversity and
complexity of the ways people cope with stress and in order to make a significant
contribution to the coping field it is necessary to start focusing on specific coping subtypes.
In the present study cognitive coping or conscious emotion regulation strategies will
therefore be studied in a conceptually pure way, separate from behavioural strategies.
Another related research area is the study of defence mechanisms and their function of
protecting individuals from the emotional consequences of adversity (see for example
Perry & Cooper, 1989; Vaillant, 1994). Generally speaking, both coping and defence
processes have as a primary function the task of dealing with stress. They refer, however,
to different processes: whereas coping mechanisms in general are assumed to involve a
conscious, purposeful effort, defence mechanisms (such as projection, denial, distortion,
displacement) in general are assumed to refer to processes that occur without conscious
efforts (Cramer, 1998). It should, however, be acknowledged that the boundary between
coping and defences may not always be so clear, as some defence processes may become
conscious just as certain coping processes may become unconscious (see Vaillant, 1998,
for a discussion on this topic). For the sake of clarity, however, defence mechanisms will
not be included in the present study. The present study will exclusively focus on conscious
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cognitive coping or emotion regulation strategies. The term cognitive emotion regulation
strategy can be used in two ways: (i) to indicate the conscious cognitive strategies used in a
specific context or situation or in response to a specific stressor and (ii) to indicate the
conscious thoughts or cognitions in stressful encounters that can be considered as a
characteristic style of the individual and can be, empirically, defined by their stability or
consistency over time and conditions (Lazarus, 1999). The present study will focus on the
latter, i.e. conscious cognitive coping or emotion regulation styles.
Although the capability of advanced thinking and regulating emotions through thoughts
or cognitions is universal, large individual differences exist in the amount of cognitive
activity and in the content of thoughts of people by means of which they regulate their
emotions in response to life experiences, events, and stressors. Large individual
differences also exist in the extent that people develop symptoms of psychopathology in
response to adverse experiences. This raises the important question of whether it might be
true that by using certain cognitive styles, people are more vulnerable to developing
psychopathology in response to negative life events or that by using other cognitive styles,
people can more easily tolerate or master negative life experiences. If so, which aspects of
cognitive emotion regulation are the most damaging or the most protective?
In a previous study, a new theoretically based instrument was developed including nine
conceptually different conscious cognitive emotion regulation (or coping) strategies that
people may use to regulate the emotions in response to life stress. The cognitive emotion
regulation strategies that were distinguished were self-blame, other-blame, rumination,
catastrophizing, putting into perspective, positive refocusing, positive reappraisal,
acceptance, and refocus on planning (Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001). Some of
these strategies, such as positive reappraisal or acceptance, have been called coping
strategies in previous research. Others, such as rumination or catastrophizing, refer to
separate literature fields. All separate concepts have been found to be related to mental ill-
health in previous research in some way or another.
For example, self-blame, or a self-blaming attributional style, is assumed to refer to
making internal, rather stable, and global causal attributions for the experience of negative
events (McGee, Wolfe, & Olson, 2001). It has been shown that a cognitive style of self-
blame is related to higher levels of depression (Anderson, Miller, Riger, Dill, & Sedikides,
1994; McGee et al., 2001; Kubany, Haynes, Abueg, Manke, Brennan, & Stahura, 1996),
although it has also been suggested that certain forms of self-blame (‘behavioural self-
blame’) may be associated with positive outcomes (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Blaming others
or other-blame refers to a style of putting the blame for what you have experienced on
others. With regard to a cognitive style of blaming others, the literature suggests that other-
blaming is mainly associated with behavioural problems (McGee et al., 2001). However,
associations with poorer emotional well-being have also been found (Tennen & Affleck,
1990). Research on the role of other-blame in general has been sparse. Ruminative thought
commonly refers to the experience of repetitive thoughts in the absence of immediate
environmental cueing (see Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999).
Although certain forms of ruminative thinking may be helpful in coping with stressful life
events (Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Tedeschi, 1999), a ruminative thinking style in general is
found to be related to decreased psychological well-being and depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker,
& Larson, 1994). Catastrophizing refers to thoughts of explicitly emphasizing the terror of
an experience. In general, a catastrophizing style has been found to be related to
maladaptation, emotional distress, and depression (Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 1995).
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Putting into perspective refers to thoughts of playing down the seriousness of the event or
emphasizing its relativity when compared to other events. Also the concept of (social)
comparison or putting into perspective has been found to be an important issue in relation
to well-being (Allan & Gilbert, 1995; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). In addition, the coping
literature has shown for positive refocusing, positive reappraisal, acceptance, and refocus
on planning that these cognitive coping styles have moderately positive relationships with
measures of optimism and self-esteem and negative relationships with measures of
depression and anxiety (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Other
studies failed to find a significant relationship between these styles and psychopathology
(Vollrath, Alnaes, & Torgersen, 1996). It may also be argued that there may be
circumstances under which the use of these cognitive styles would not be adaptive at all.
Although it seems clear from the research evidence that each of the above mentioned
cognitive emotion regulation strategies are important with regard to the understanding of
mental ill-health, on the basis of these studies nothing can be concluded about the joint
contributions of the separate cognitive strategies to psychopathology, as, generally
speaking, the separate constructs refer to separate research traditions and a separate
literature ranging from coping research to studies on mood regulation, mood repair,
defence, and affect regulation (see Gross, 1998). Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to
assume that the separate strategies rather refer to contributory or overlapping processes
than to independent, disconnected processes. In order to fully understand the joint role of
different cognitive emotion regulation strategies, a comprehensive, integrative study of the
relationship between multiple cognitive emotion regulation strategies and mental health
seems necessary.
A recent study in secondary school children studied the relative influence of the nine
above mentioned cognitive emotion regulation strategies on the reporting of symptoms of
depression and anxiety. It was found that whereas especially self-blame, rumination, and
catastrophizing were related to the reporting of more symptomatology in adolescents,
positive reappraisal was related to the reporting of fewer symptoms of depression and
anxiety, showing that the study of the relative influence of the different strategies is an
important research area (Garnefski et al., 2001). It also confirms that cognitive emotion
regulation strategies may represent an important central theoretical issue in the
explanation of symptomatology of mental disorders. Thus far, however, the research has
been limited to ‘general population’ youngsters, which makes it unclear to what extent the
findings of this study are applicable to other populations. Against this background, there is
a need for more studies focusing on the question of what the relationship is between the
use of specific cognitive emotion regulation strategies and psychopathology. On the basis
of such studies, important clues may be found with regard to the identification of
subgroups of people at risk for the development of psychopathology. If it turns out to be
true that some people—by using certain cognitive styles—are more vulnerable, while
others—by using other styles—are more resilient to the development of disturbances, this
would carry important opportunities for a more targeted tailoring of treatment and
preventive measures.
The aim of the present research was to study the relationship between the use of the nine
specific cognitive emotion regulation strategies mentioned above and psychopathology in
adults. More specifically, the cognitive emotion regulation strategies used in a clinical
adult population with symptoms of depression and anxiety were compared to a group of
non-clinical adults without symptoms of depression and anxiety in a cross-sectional
design. The first goal was to focus on the extent to which differences existed in the
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reporting of the specific emotion regulation strategies between members of the clinical and
the non-clinical group. It was hypothesised that members of the clinical population would
yield higher scores on self-blame, rumination, and catastrophizing as most of the previous
research on these aspects showed relationships with symptoms of psychopathology
(Anderson et al., 1994; McGee et al., 2001; Kubany et al., 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000;
Sullivan et al., 1995). It was also expected that the non-clinical population would report
more use of the cognitive strategies blaming others, putting into perspective, positive
refocusing, positive reappraisal, acceptance, and refocus on planning, as most of the
previous research had shown positive relationships of these strategies with well-being
(Garnefski et al., 2001; Tedeschi, 1999).
The second goal was to study which of the specific cognitive emotion regulation
strategies were relatively best able to distinguish between these two samples. As it was
assumed that the separate strategies refer to overlapping processes, logistic regression
analysis was performed to be able to study the unique ‘influence’ of the separate cognitive
emotion regulation strategies, while controlling for the influence of the other strategies. It
was expected that together the cognitive emotion regulation strategies would account for a
considerable amount of the variance and that self-blame, rumination, and catastrophizing
would be significantly related to clinical group membership, while the other cognitive
strategies would be significantly related to non-clinical group membership (Garnefski
et al., 2001).
METHOD
Participants
The total sample comprised 198 adults: 99 from a clinical sample and 99 from a non-
clinical sample. The two groups were matched by age and gender. Each of the groups
consisted of 47 males and 52 females, with ages ranging from 18 to 68 (mean age is 36).
The two subsamples will be described in more detail below.
Clinical group
Sample characteristics
The subsample of clinical patients consisted of 99 adults ranging in age from 18 to 68
years (mean age 36). There were 47 males. As regards the other background variables,
56.3% were married or lived together with a partner, while 34.4% were unmarried, 7.3%
was divorced, and 2.1% was widowed. As regards education level, 17.2% indicated to have
lower education as the highest form of completed education (no secondary education at
all), 16.1% had completed lower vocational education (three years of secondary
education), 14.0% lower general secondary education (four years of secondary education),
12.9% intermediate vocational education (continuing education after finishing lower
vocational or lower general secondary education), 20.4% higher general secondary or pre-
university education (respectively five and six years of secondary education), and 19.4%
higher vocational education or university.
Procedure
The 99 participants in the clinical group formed a subset of a larger sample of 169 persons
referred for treatment at an outpatient psychiatric clinic in the Netherlands in the period
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between January and October 2000. A self-report questionnaire was sent to the home
address of all these 169 persons, which they were requested to fill in at home and bring
along to their first interview on admission to outpatient psychiatric treatment. The subset
of 99 patients was obtained in two steps. First, persons were excluded who had too many
missing data, i.e. for whom it was not possible to calculate subscale scores. A subset of
120 participants remained. Second, to unambiguously define the clinical sample as
consisting of persons with elevated depressive and anxiety symptoms, persons were
excluded who showed only low to moderate levels of symptoms of depression and anxiety.
To make this selection, scores on the SCL-90 subscales for depression and anxiety were
used (see Instruments for a description of this questionnaire). In the final subset, only
participants were included who had above average depression scores as well as above
average anxiety scores according to the norm tables of the SCL-90 for the non-clinical
population, for males and females separately (Arrindell & Ettema, 1986). Because there
was a high rate of ‘comorbidity’ regarding the presence of anxiety and depressive
symptoms in this sample (90%), it was decided that both depressive and anxiety symptoms
had to be above average to be included in the sample. In total, a final subset of 99
participants was obtained. No significant differences were found between selected
(N¼ 99) and nonselected participants (N¼ 70) regarding the background variables.
Non-clinical group
Sample characteristics
A matched non-clinical group of 99 adults was obtained with 47 males and ages ranging
from 18 to 68 years (mean age 36). In this group 60.6% were married or lived together,
33.3% unmarried, 5.1% divorced, and 1.0% widowed. Education levels ranged from 3.0%
with lower education as the highest form of completed education, 3.0% lower vocational
education, 8.1% lower general secondary education, 18.2% intermediate vocational
education, and 12.1% higher general secondary or pre-university education to 55.6%
higher vocational education or university.
Procedure
The non-clinical group of 99 adults formed a subset of a total general population sample of
630 adults. This sample was obtained by approaching the population of a general
practitioner’s office in the period between January and April 2000. In total 2029
questionnaires (one per household) were sent to the home addresses, of which 630 were
returned and 22 could not be delivered to the correct address. Because of ethical issues, it
was not possible to obtain information on eventual differences between the 630 people
who filled out the questionnaire and the 1377 who did not. People who filled out the
questionnaire were guaranteed anonymity.
The subset of 99 non-clinical adults was obtained in two steps. First, to unambiguously
define the non-clinical group as consisting of persons without depressive and anxiety
symptoms, persons were excluded who showed elevated levels of symptoms of depression
and anxiety. To be able to define the non-clinical sample as participants without such
symptoms, only participants were included who had depression and anxiety scores that
were average or below average according to the same SCL-90 normscores (i.e. of the non-
clinical population) that were used to determine the clinical sample (Arrindell & Ettema,
1986). On the basis of this criterion, a total of 393 persons was selected from the general
population sample. Second, it was decided to obtain two equally sized and matched
subgroups. As the smallest subgroup, i.e. the clinical sample, contained 99 participants, 99
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participants had to be selected from the general population sample. Matching criteria were
age and gender. Although the clinical and non-clinical sample obviously also differed in
their level of education, it was not possible to use level of education as the third matching
criterion. The size of the sample appeared too small to be able to find enough matches
when including this criterion as well as gender and age.
Each person in the clinical group was matched with a person of the same sex and age in
the general population group. No significant differences were found between selected
(N¼ 99) and nonselected participants (N¼ 531) in their background variables except for
mean age: the selected group had a mean age of 36, whereas in the non-selected group a
mean age of 43 was observed (t(611)¼ 5.22; p¼ 0.000).
Instruments
Cognitive emotion regulation
The Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ) (Garnefski et al., 2001) was
used to assess what participants tend to think after the experiences of threatening or
stressful life events. The instrument includes nine conceptually distinct scales. These
scales all consist of four items referring to what people think after the experience of
threatening or stressful life events, ranging from 1 ((almost) never) to 5 ((almost) always).
A subscale score can be obtained by adding up the four items: the minimal score is 4 and
the maximum score 20. The higher the subscale score, the more the specific cognitive
strategy is used. The following cognitive emotion regulation strategies were measured:
self-blame, referring to thoughts of putting the blame for what you have experienced on
yourself (example item: ‘I feel that I am the one to blame for it’); other-blame, referring to
thoughts of putting the blame for what you have experienced on the environment or
another person (example item: ‘I feel that others are to blame for it’); rumination or focus
on thought, referring to thinking about the feelings and thoughts associated with the
negative event (example item: ‘I often think about how I feel about what I have
experienced’); catastrophizing, referring to thoughts of explicitly emphasizing the terror
of what you have experienced (example item: ‘I often think that what I have experienced is
the worst that can happen to a person’); putting into perspective, referring to thoughts of
brushing aside the seriousness of the event/emphasizing the relativity when comparing it
with other events (example item: ‘I tell myself there are worse things in life’); positive
refocusing, referring to thinking about joyful and pleasant issues instead of thinking about
the actual event (example item: ‘I think of something nice instead of what has happened’);
positive reappraisal, referring to thoughts of creating a positive meaning to the event in
terms of personal growth (example item: ‘I think I can learn something from the situation’);
acceptance, referring to thoughts of accepting what you have experienced and resigning
yourself to what has happened (example item: ‘I think that I have to accept that this has
happened’); and refocus on planning, referring to thinking about what steps to take and how
to handle the negative event (example item: ‘I think about a plan of what I can do best’).
In a recent study the reliabilities of the scales of the CERQ were reported. The lowest
alpha reliability was 0.68 (blaming others) and the highest 0.83 (rumination). Five of the
alphas were above 0.80. The test–retest correlations after a period of five months were
found to be acceptable to good with values ranging between 0.41 (acceptance) and 0.59
(refocus on planning) (Garnefski et al., 2001). In the clinical sample Cronbach’s alpha
ranged from 0.72 (acceptance) to 0.85 (self-blame). In the non-clinical population
reliabilities ranged from 0.76 (acceptance) to 0.86 (refocus on planning).
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Depressive and anxiety symptomatology
Depressive and anxiety symptomatology was measured by two subscales of the SCL-90,
namely Depression and Anxiety (Symptom Checklist: Derogatis, 1977; Dutch translation
and adaptation by Arrindell & Ettema, 1986).
The main function of including this measure in the present study was to use its norm
tables to determine whether participants have below average, average, or above average
levels of symptoms of depression and/or anxiety. The subscale Depression includes 16
items, referring to symptoms of depression, for example low mood, incapability to enjoy,
lowered self-esteem, loss of appetite, and lack of energy. The subscale Anxiety includes
ten items, referring to symptoms of anxiety, such as heightened vegetative arousal,
nervousness, tension, panic attacks, and restlessness. Each of the items is measured on a
five-point Likert scale of distress, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much). The
minimum depression score is 16 and the maximum 64. The minimum anxiety score is 10,
the maximum 40. The SCL-90 manual reports reliability coefficients ranging from 0.82 to
0.93 for the depression subscale and from 0.71 to 0.91 for the anxiety subscale and shows
that test–retest reliabilities are good and that convergent validity with other conceptually
related scales is strong, for both subscales (Arrindell & Ettema, 1986; Derogatis, 1977).
Life events
A checklist was used to collect data on the experience of negative life events. The main
function of including this measure was to be able to control for the influence of number of
negative life events in studying the relationships between cognitive emotion regulation
strategies and symptomatology.
Life events that were measured were divorce of parents and/or self, long-lasting and/or
severe physical or mental illness of self and/or significant others, death of a spouse and/or
significant others, attempted suicide of self and/or significant others, violence, abuse of
drugs and/or alcohol within family and/or relationship, unwanted pregnancy, having been
victim of crime, accident, sexual abuse and/or physical abuse (self ). These events were
assessed for three different periods of life, before the age of 16, between the age of 16 and 1
year ago, and the last year, and in none of these periods. For the purpose of the present study
only the total number of life events experienced throughout life was included as a variable.
RESULTS
Differences in reporting of cognitive emotion regulation strategies
between clinical and non-clinical group
To study the extent to which the nine cognitive emotion regulation strategies were reported
by members of the clinical sample in comparison with the non-clinical sample, means and
standard deviations were calculated in both samples. The results are shown in Table 1.
To study whether an overall multivariate difference existed in the reporting of cognitive
emotion regulation strategies between members of the clinical and the non-clinical group,
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed. Gender was also included as
independent variable in order to test for its possible main and interaction effects. The main
effect for gender (Wilks ¼ 0.91; F(9, 185)¼ 1.92; p¼ 0.091) as well as the interaction
effect between gender and clinical versus non-clinical group membership (Wilks ¼ 0.98;
F(9, 185)¼ 0.43; p¼ 0.917) were not significant. The results showed that there was a
significant difference between the clinical and non-clinical sample (Wilks ¼ 0.54;
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F(9, 185)¼ 17.31; p¼ 0.000). To study which of the nine specific cognitive emotion
regulation strategies were at the basis of this overall significance, t-tests were used. Table 1
shows that significant differences between the clinical population and the non-clinical
group were found for the reporting of the cognitive emotion regulation strategies
catastrophizing, self-blame, rumination, other-blame, positive reappraisal, and accep-
tance. Of these strategies only the strategy positive reappraisal appeared to be reported
significantly more often by the non-clinical group than by the clinical sample. All the other
strategies were reported significantly more often by the clinical than by the non-clinical
sample. The two samples did not show significant differences in the reporting of putting
into perspective, refocus on planning, or positive refocusing.
Pearson intercorrelations between CERQ subscales
among clinical and non-clinical sample
Correlations between subscales ranged between 0.05 (‘other-blame’ and ‘refocus on
planning’) and 0.56 (‘positive reappraisal’ and ‘putting into perspective’) in the clinical
sample and between 0.06 (‘positive refocusing’ and ‘self-blame’) and 0.62 (‘positive
reappraisal and ‘refocus on planning’) in the non-clinical sample. This indicates moderate
to strong correlations between the subscales (Table 2). This suggests that multivariate
analyses should be performed to study the relationship between cognitive emotion
regulation strategies and clinical versus non-clinical group membership in order to be able
to determine unique relationships, while accounting for the mutual correlations.
Prediction of clinical and non-clinical group membership:
logistic regression analysis
To identify which of the cognitive emotion regulation strategies, relative to the others,
were the most important variables for distinguishing between the two samples, Logistic
regression analysis was performed. Logistic regression is a statistical technique related to
multiple regression analysis that can be used to predict a binary dependent variable from a
set of independent variables. In the present analysis, the binary dependent variable referred
to group membership (clinical versus non-clinical group), whereas the independent
variable set referred to the cognitive emotion regulation strategies.
Table 1. Differences in the reporting of cognitive emotion regulation strategies between clinical
and non-clinical group: means, standard deviations and t-tests
Cognitive emotion Clinical sample Non-clinical sample t-test for equality
regulation strategies (n¼ 99) (n¼ 99) of means
M SD M SD t p
Self-blame 10.97 4.21 7.42 2.65 7.09 0.000
Other-blame 7.76 3.55 5.63 2.07 5.16 0.000
Rumination 12.64 4.04 9.28 3.41 6.31 0.000
Catastrophizing 9.11 4.19 5.37 1.53 8.32 0.000
Acceptance 11.68 3.74 10.22 3.93 2.66 0.008
Putting into perspective 10.54 3.86 11.35 3.96 1.47 0.144
Positive refocusing 9.21 3.65 9.70 4.29 0.86 0.390
Positive reappraisal 10.19 4.09 12.73 4.23 4.29 0.000
Refocus on planning 12.62 3.86 13.00 4.15 0.66 0.509
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Because the two groups appeared to differ significantly as regards the reporting of
number of life events as well as level of education,1 it was decided to control for these
variables in the logistic regression analysis. Therefore, first these variables were entered as
independent variables in the logistic regression analysis, yielding a significant model
(chi2(2)¼ 66.05; p¼ 0.000), explaining 29.2% of the variance (Cox & Snell R2).
Subsequently, the nine cognitive emotion regulation strategies were added as independent
variables, increasing the explained variance by 24%. Total variance explained was 53.2%
(chi2(11)¼ 145.08; p¼ 0.000). Table 3 presents the results of this logistic regression
analysis including level of education, number of life events, and the nine cognitive
emotion regulation strategies as independent variables. The Wald statistic was used to
determine the significance of the contribution of the independent variables. The
standardised logistic regression coefficient (standardised B) is used to determine the
relative influence of the separate independent variables.
Table 3 shows that, after controlling for level of education, total number of life events,
and the other cognitive emotion regulation strategies, three cognitive emotion regulation
strategies appeared to have significant, independent contributions to the prediction of
clinical group membership: self-blame, positive reappraisal, and catastrophizing. The
cognitive emotion regulation strategy of self-blame appeared to be the best predictor of
group membership, with a standardized logistic regression coefficient (standardized B) of
0.34, showing that clinical group membership was associated with a higher reported use
of this strategy. Also positive reappraisal appeared to be a strong predictor of group
membership, with a standardized B of 0.28, indicating that clinical group membership also
was associated with a lower reported use of this strategy. The third significant predictor
was catastrophizing, with a standardized B of 0.24, showing that clinical group
membership was related to a higher reported use of this particular strategy, as well.
As the model presented in Table 3 includes several strategies that are not significant
contributors, they may have artificially increased the percentage of variance explained.
Therefore, another logistic regression analysis was performed including the significant
1The clinical sample reported significantly more negative life events (t(190)¼ 6.71; p¼ 0.000) as well as a
significantly lower level of education (t(196)¼6.16; p¼ 0.000).
Table 3. Identification of cognitive emotion regulation strategies distinguishing clinical (n¼ 99)
and non-clinical (n¼ 99) group membership: logistic regression analysis
Predictors B SE B Wald Standardized B p
Level of education 0.60 0.18 11.52 0.23 0.001
Total life events 0.21 0.07 8.72 0.19 0.003
Self-blame 0.38 0.09 16.46 0.34 0.000
Other-blame 0.15 0.12 1.73 0.11 0.188
Rumination 0.13 0.08 2.57 0.12 0.109
Catastrophizing 0.28 0.12 5.56 0.24 0.018
Putting into perspective 0.04 0.09 0.23 0.04 0.631
Positive refocusing 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.927
Positive reappraisal 0.28 0.09 10.08 0.28 0.002
Acceptance 0.08 0.09 0.91 0.07 0.340
Refocus on planning 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.874
Total explained variance (Cox & Snell R2): 53.2%.
Significance model: chi2(11)¼ 145.08, p¼ 0.000.
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predictors only. The results are presented in Table 4. The results show that this final model
still explains 51.9% of the total variance, while the conclusions remain the same. After
controlling for the influence of number of life events and level of education, there are three
strategies that contribute significantly to the prediction of clinical versus non-clinical
group membership: self-blame, positive reappraisal, and catastrophizing.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The present study focused on the relationship between the use of specific conscious
cognitive emotion regulation strategies and mental health. Although previous studies have
clearly shown that cognitive emotion regulation strategies, such as self-blame and
rumination, are related to poorer emotional well-being, conclusions about separate
constructs in general appear to refer to separate research traditions (Gross, 1998). The
present study adds to the existing literature by including the separate cognitive emotion
regulation strategies in one and the same study in order to study their joint contributions to
psychopathology.
As expected, members of the clinical population had significantly higher scores on self-
blame, rumination, and catastrophizing and lower scores on positive reappraisal. These
findings confirm previous research (e.g. McGee et al., 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1997;
Sullivan et al., 1995). The clinical population also showed higher scores on other-blame
and acceptance, which was not in line with the expectations. The finding regarding other-
blame does, however, concur with theories stating that both kinds of blame, i.e. a
continuing focus on blaming oneself or another, may form an obstacle to adaptation to
negative life events or trauma (Tedeschi, 1999). As regards acceptance, an explanation
may be found in the theory that a distinction can be made between acceptance as an active
process of self-affirmation and acceptance as a passive form of resignation to negative
experiences (Wilson, 1996). It might be argued that the present study rather refers to the
latter form of acceptance, which has typically been identified as a negative adjustment
style associated with poor outcomes (Wilson, 1996). No significant differences were found
between the clinical and non-clinical population in the reporting of thoughts of putting into
perspective, positive refocusing, and refocus on planning. Although there were some
exceptions, the bivariate results in general appeared to confirm the findings of previous
studies showing a relationship between the separate cognitive emotion regulation
strategies and psychopathology.
Table 4. Distinction between clinical (n¼ 99) and non-clinical (n¼ 99) group membership: final
logistic regression model
Predictors B SE B Wald Standardized B p
Level of education 0.57 0.16 13.67 0.24 0.000
Total life events 0.24 0.07 10.62 0.24 0.001
Self-blame 0.41 0.08 24.35 0.40 0.000
Catastrophizing 0.26 0.09 8.02 0.24 0.005
Positive reappraisal 0.19 0.06 9.96 0.21 0.002
Total explained variance (Cox & Snell R2): 51.9%.
Significance model: chi2(5)¼ 140.43, p¼ 0.000.
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In addition, the present study studied the joint contributions of the separate strategies to
psychopathology, while controlling for their interrelations. It was shown that after
controlling for level of education, number of life events, and the other strategies, only three
cognitive emotion regulation strategies remained to have significant, independent
contributions to the ‘prediction’ of clinical group membership: i.e. a higher reported use
of the strategy self-blame, a higher reported use of catastrophizing, and a lower reported
use of the strategy positive reappraisal. As expected, these cognitive emotion regulation
strategies together explained a considerable amount of the variance. It seems clear from
these results that although six of the nine specific cognitive emotion regulation strategies
in some way or another show relationships with mental ill-health, the separate strategies
rather refer to contributory or overlapping processes than to independent, disconnected
processes. For example, our bivariate results clearly confirm the findings of previous
studies showing that rumination as a cognitive emotion regulation style is related to
psychopathology (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994). On the basis of the present study,
however, the conclusion can be added that after controlling for the influence of self-blame,
catastrophizing, and positive reappraisal, an independent effect for rumination could not
longer be established. Also the effects of other-blame and acceptance disappeared, after
controlling for the other strategies.
Although the results should not lead to the conclusion that the strategies of rumination,
other-blame, and acceptance are not important with regard to mental health, they do confirm
our earlier statement that, in order to fully understand the role of separate cognitive emotion
regulation strategies, comprehensive, integrative studies of the relationships between
cognitive emotion regulation strategies and mental health are necessary. The results show,
that psychopathology can not be traced to one specific emotion regulation strategy, but to a
combined ‘play’ of various strategies. A theoretical implication is that studies on the relation
between cognitive emotion regulation and dysfunction should not focus on a single
cognitive strategy at the time, but on all cognitive strategies at the same time in order to be
complete and of value. In addition, the results suggest the relevance of identifying
(individual) symptom patterns crossing the boundaries of ‘adaptive’ and ‘less adaptive’
strategies. For example, there may exist large differences between adolescents who report
different patterns of ‘cognitive coping strategies’, especially between adolescents who
report predominantly ‘less adaptive’ strategies, adolescents who report predominantly ‘more
adaptive’ strategies, adolescents who report both types of strategy, and those who report to
make no or only scarce use of any of the cognitive coping strategies.
Another theoretical implication refers to the coping research tradition. Since about
1974, the year in which Lazarus et al. (1974) launched his cognitive appraisal model, the
most widely used framework to classify coping responses has been the problem-focused
versus emotion-focused model, despite some conceptual problems. One of the problems
refers to the fact that both the problem and emotion-focused dimensions are made up of a
mix of cognitive and behavioural coping strategies (i.e. thinking and acting), while it
would be reasonable to assume that, theoretically, cognitive coping and taking actions can
be considered as very different processes (Compas et al., 2001; Garnefski et al., 2001). Our
results confirm the statement of Compas et al. (2001), suggesting that models that have
included only the distinction between problem- and emotion-focused coping and those that
have included only approach and avoidance coping do not reflect the actual structure of
coping in individuals. Our results add the conclusion that theories about dysfunctioning
should consider cognitive coping strategies and behavioural coping strategies in
conceptually pure and distinct ways.
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The relationship between the use of specific cognitive emotion regulation strategies and
the reporting of symptoms of depression and anxiety suggests that the existence of
depression and anxiety symptoms may form an indication for the existence of—possibly
long-established—‘unadaptive’ strategies of cognitive emotion regulation. However, as
the results of the present study are based on cross-sectional data, it is important to
acknowledge that no conclusions can be drawn about directions of influence.
Theoretically, it would be just as likely that certain cognitive coping strategies lead to
emotional problems such as depression and anxiety, as the other way around. Circular
causal mechanisms may also be at work, which would make both assumptions true at the
same time. Or even a third variable may account for the relation between the reporting of
specific cognitive emotion regulation strategies and the reporting of symptoms of
depression and/or anxiety. The cross-sectional nature of the study will also not allow us to
draw conclusions regarding the development, course, and changes of symptom patterns
and patterns of cognitive emotion regulation in time. More prospective design studies
should be set up in the future answering questions such as whether a temporal order can be
found in the emergence of emotional and behavioural symptoms and the use of specific
cognitive emotion regulation strategies or whether the individual’s use of a particular
cognitive emotion regulation strategy in a certain stressful event or situation refers to a
stable factor or is rather subject to change in the course of time.
Still, whatever the directions of influence may be, it is clearly shown that the use of
certain cognitive coping strategies and serious disturbances are related issues. This
suggests that cognitive strategies should play an important role in theoretical models and
intervention strategies. It may, therefore, be worthwhile to aim intervention efforts
simultaneously at psychopathology and cognitive emotion regulation strategies. The
assumption that a patient’s symptoms will be relieved if irrational beliefs or dysfunctional
thoughts are changed is not a new one. In fact, one of the basic premises of cognitive
therapies is that things are inappropriately viewed by people suffering from depressive or
anxiety symptoms and that therapy should bring about changes in those views (see for
example Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1962). New is that our approach and results might give some
clues for a more targeted tailoring of treatment, for example by challenging ‘unadaptive’
strategies such as self-blaming and catastrophizing and supplying more ‘adaptive’
strategies such as positive reappraisal, at the same time.
In the present study, cognitive emotion regulation strategies were studied, separate from
other emotion regulation strategies. The conclusions of the present study therefore only
refer to the conscious cognitive emotion regulation strategies people may use when
handling a negative event. Nothing can be concluded about other, related emotion
regulation strategies, such as defence mechanisms or behavioural coping strategies, or
about the ways the different types of emotion regulation strategy co-occur or interact with
each other. Although we believe that it is important to describe aspects of the construct, in
conceptually pure ways, we also believe that it is only a first step. It should be
acknowledged that boundaries between different emotion regulation strategies may not
always be so clear and that apparently separate strategies may actually refer to related and/
or overlapping emotion regulation processes. For example, Vaillant (1998) emphasized
that overlap may exist between ‘unconscious’ defence and ‘conscious’ coping processes.
Moreover, although cognitive and behavioural coping strategies refer to two different
processes employed at different points of time, it could also not be denied that the
processes are related and may influence each other (Garnefski et al., 2001). In the same
way, overlap or relationships may be assumed between other emotion regulation
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processes, for example between physiological, attentional, and cognitive processes (Gross,
1998). Future research should therefore focus on two directions: (i) to unravel the separate
constructs referring to the broad concept of emotion regulation and (ii) to study the
relations and possible interactions between those constructs.
A limitation of the design was that the detection of depression and anxiety symptoms as
well as the assessment of cognitive emotion regulation strategies had to be made on the
basis of self-reported evaluations, which may have caused some bias. The results of this
study may be an under- or overestimation of the extent to which cognitive emotion
regulation strategies are applied in reality. It should also be acknowledged that by using
self-report measures the results may be biased by individual response styles. It is impor-
tant for future studies to address research questions concerning cognitive emotion
regulation by using both self-reported and other forms of data collection, such as
interviews, expert judgements, or experimental research.
Our clinical sample comprised participants who were announced for treatment at an
outpatient psychiatric clinic and were characterized by elevated symptoms of both
depression and anxiety. Although by this selection homogeneity of the sample was
obtained, it is unclear to what extent the findings are generalizable to persons with other
types of disturbance. In addition, no information was available about the type of diagnosis
the participants in the clinical sample had received. It should be acknowledged that the
type of diagnosis, for example whether the participants were mostly diagnosed with
anxiety disorder, mood disorder, or another or mixed type of disorder, may have influenced
the results.
A strong point of the study, however, was that the clinical sample was compared with a
‘non-clinical’ sample without symptoms of depression and anxiety and that a matched
control design was used to examine differences between the two groups. However, because
of the sample sizes, we were not able to match the groups by educational level. Although
the results of the logistic regression analyses were corrected for level of education, it could
still be argued that some of the differences between clinical and non-clinical sample may
reflect differences in intelligence.
To be able to further develop the concept of cognitive emotion regulation, it is important
to answer questions such as whether strategies that are considered ‘adaptive’ in the present
study are indeed adaptive in all circumstances (Gross, 1999). It may very well be true that a
certain cognitive coping strategy that is highly adaptive in one situation is absolutely not in
another situation. In the present study the concept of cognitive emotion regulation is
considered from a trait or style perspective. According to Lazarus (1993) the approaches to
coping both as a style and as a situation-specific process are essential in that they each
address different aspects of the coping process. In our opinion, it is a challenge in the
development of the concept of cognitive emotion regulation to address both the trait and
the situation-specific aspects in future, or, as Lazarus very wisely states, ‘combining the
approaches without sacrificing what is unique in each might be a worthwile enterprise’
(Lazarus, 1993, p. 243). On the one hand, it is important to study cognitive emotion
regulation over time and across diverse types of negative life event in the same persons. On
the other hand, cognitive emotion regulation should be studied across individuals
experiencing the same type of negative life event or trauma. Both types of study call for
complex, long-term research designs.
Despite some limitations, the results clearly show that the use of certain cognitive
emotion regulation strategies and the reporting of symptoms of depression and anxiety are
closely related. The exploratory character of the results makes replication, thorough
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testing and further development (e.g. inclusion of other factors), necessary. Prospective
elements should be included in the model. However, if our results can be confirmed, they
carry important implications for the focus and content of intervention and prevention of
mental health problems.
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